In '~ost men work," Q -"most", P = "man", and R -"work".
Q will be referred to as a determiner.
A determiner Q is monotone increasing if and only if for any RI and R2 such that the denotation of R1 is a subset of the denotation of R2, "Q Ps RI" implies "Q Ps R2" (Barwlse and Cooper [1981] ). For example, letting RI -"work hard" and R2 = "work", since "most men work hard" implies "most men work," the determiner "most" is monotone increasing.
Intuitively, making the verb phrase more general doesn't change the truth value.
Other monotone increasing determiners are "every", "some", "many", "several", "'any" and "a few".
"No" and "few" are not. For collective predicates such as "meet" and "agree", R would apply to the set rather than to each of its elements.
(3 s) 0(s,{x I F(x)}) ~ R(s)
Sometimes with singular noun phrases and determiners llke "a", "some" and "any" it will be more convenient to treat the determiner as a relation between a set and one of its elements. Then in Section 2.4 the scope-neutral representation is presented.
Determiners as Relations between Sets
Expressing determiners as relations between sets allows us to express as axioms in a knowledge base more refined properties of the determiners than can be captured by representing them in terms of the standard quantlflers.
First let us note that, with the proper definitions of "every" and "some", (V sl,s2) every(sl,s2) <-> sl= s2 (y x,s2) some(x, s2) <-> x~s2 
consider "any". Instead of trying to force an interpretation of "any" as a standard quantifier, let us take it to mean "a random element of".
(2) (~x,s) any(x,s) ~> x = random(s),
where "random" is a function that returns a random element of a set. This means that the prototypical use of "any" is in sentences like Pick any card.
Let me surround this with caveats. This can't be right, if for no other reason than that "any" is surely a more "primitive" notion in language than "random".
Nevertheless, mathematics gives us firm intuitions about "random" and (2) may thus shed light on some linguistic facts.
Many of the linguistic facts about "any" can be subsumed under two broad characterizations:
i. It requires a "modal" or "nondeflnlte" context.
For example, "John talks to any woman" must be interpreted dispositlonally. If we adopt (2), we can see this as deriving from the nature of randomness. It simply does not make sense to say of an actual entity that it is random.
2.
It normally acts as a universal quantifier outside the scope of the most immediate modal embedder. This is usually the most natural interpretation of "random".
Moreover, since "any" extracts a single element, we can make sense out of cases in which "any" fails to act llke "every".
I'Ii talk to anyone but only to one person. * I'Ii talk to everyone but only to one person.
John wants to marry any Swedish woman. * John wants to marry every Swedish woman.
(The second pair is due to Moore [1973] Sill, "see'(E,J,S)" will mean that E is John's seeing of Bill.
For the purposes of this paper, we can consider that the primed and unprimed predicates are related by the following axiom schema:
It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on the approach further, but it will be assumed, and taken to extremes, in the remainder of the paper. Let me illustrate the extremes to which it will be taken. Frequently we want to refer to the condition of two predicates p and q holding simultaneously of x. For this we will refer to the entity e such that and' [e,el,e2) 
Here el is the condition of p being true of x, e2 is the condition of q being true of X, and e the condition of the conjunction being true.
2.4.
The Scope-Neu¢ral Representation
We will assume that a set has a typical element and that the logical form for a plural noun phrase will include reference to a set and its ~z~ical element. We could get around this problem by positing a special set of predicates that apply to typical elements and are systematically related to the predicates that apply to real elements.
This idea should be rejected as being ad ho__~c, if aid did not come to us from an unexpected quarter --the notion of "grain size".
When utterances
predicate, it is normally at some degree of resolution, or "grain". At a fairly coarse grain, we might say that John is at the post office --"at(J,PO)". At a more refined grain, we have to say that he is at the stamp window --"at(J,SW)'"
We normally think of grain in terms of distance, but more generally we can move from entities at one grain to entities at a coarser grain by means of an arbitrary partition. Fine-grained entities in the same equivalence class are indistinguishable at the coarser grain.
Given a set S, consider the partition that collapses all elements of S into one element and leaves everything else unchanged.
We can view the typical element of S as the set of real elements seen at this coarser grain --a grain at which, precisely, the elements of the set are indistinguishable.
Formally, we can define an operator ~ which takes a set and a predicate as its arguments and produces what will be referred to as an "indexed predicate":
We will frequently abbreviate this "P5 " Note that predicate indexing gets us out of the above 3 An alternative approach would be to say that the typical element is in fact one of the real elements of the set, but that we will never know which one, and that furthermore, we will never know about the typical element any property that is not true of all the elements.
This approach runs into technical difficulties involving the empty set. 
(5) (Vs)([(¥x~s) p(x)] -> p~(~s)))
That is, the properties of the typical element at the coarser grain are also the properties of the real elements at the finer grain, and the typical element has those properties that all the real elements have.
Note that while we can infer a property from set membership, we cannot infer set membership from a property. That is, the fact that p is true of a typical element of a set s and p is true of an entity y, does not imply that y is an element of s. After all, we will want "three men" to refer to a set, and to be able to infer from y's being in the set the fact that y is a man. But we do not want to infer from y's being a man that y is in the set. Nevertheless, we will need a notation for expressing this stronger relation among a set, a typical element, and a defining condition.
In to the condition e of p (or p$) being true of the typical element x of s --"p~ (e,x)". Expression (6) can then be translated into the following flat predlcate-argument form:
(7) set(s,x,e) & p~ (e,x) This should be read as saying that s is a set whose typical element is x and which is defined by condition e, which is the condition of p (interpreted at the level of the typical element) being true of x. The two critical properties of the predicate "set" which make (7) equivalent to (6) are the following: (8) ~s,x,e,y) set(s,x,e) & p~ (e,x) & p(y) -> yes (9) (~s,x,e) set(s,x,e) -> x "T(s) Axiom schema (8) tells us that if an entity y has the defining property p of the set s, then y is an element of s. Axiom (9), along with axiom schemas (4) and (3), tells us that an element of a set has the act's defining property. where ml is the set of all men, m the set of most of them referred to by the noun phrase "most men", and w the set referred to by the noun phrase "several women", and where "manl = ~'(ml,man)" and "womanl = ~" (w,woman)'. When the inferenclng component discovers there is a different set w for each element of the set m, w can be viewed as refering to the typical element of this set of sets:
w-T({f<x> { x~m})
To eliminate the set notation, we can extend the definition of the dependency function to the typical element of m as follows:
That is, f maps the typical element of a set into the typical element of the set of images under f of the elements of the set.
From here on, we will consider all dependency functions so extended to the typical elements of their domains. The second will make use of world knowledge, while the third illustrates the treatment of embedded quantlflers.
First the simple, and classic, example. M is the set of men {A,B}, W is the set of women {X,Y}, and the arrows signify love.
Let us assume that the process of interpreting this sentence is Just the process of identifying the existentially quantified variables ms and w and possibly coercing the predicates, in a way that makes the sentence true. 4 Figure I . Two models of sentence (13).
In Figure l(a) , "'love(A,X)" and "love(B,X)" are both true, so we can use axiom schema (5) to derive "lovel('~(M),X)". Thus, the identifications "ms -M'" and "w = X'" result in the sentence being true.
In
Figure l(b), "love(A,X)" and "love(B,Y)" are both true, but since these predications differ 4 Bobrow and Webber [1980] similarly show scoplng information acquired by Interpretatlon against a small model. in more than one argument, we cannot apply axiom schema (5).
First we define a dependency function f, mapping each man into a woman he loves, yielding "love(A,f(A))" and "love(B,f(B))". We can now apply axiom schema
Thus, we can make the sentence true by identifying ms with M and w with f(~'(M)), and by coercing "love" to "'love2" and "woman" to "~ (W,woman)". ,
In each case we see that the identification of w is equivalent to solving the scope ambiguity problem.
In our subsequent examples we will ignore the indexing on the predicates, until it must be mentioned in the case of embedded quantifiers. be an individual but must be the typical element of some set.
Let f be a dependency function such that wEws & f(w) = x -> had (w,x) that is, a function that maps each woman into some baby she had. Then we can identify b with f('~'(ws)), or equivalently, with ~({f(w) I w~ ws}), giving us the correct scope. That is, r arrives, where r is the typical element of a set rs defined by the conjunction ea of r's being a representative and r's being of c, where c is a company. We will consider the two models in Figure   2 . R is the set of representatives {A,B,(C)}, K is the set of companies {X,Y,(Z,W)}, there is an arrow from the representatives to the companies they represent, and the representatives who arrived are circled.
Figure 2. Two models of sentence (14).
In Figure 2 (a), "of(A,X)", "of(B,Y)" and "of(B,Z)" are true. Define a dependency function f to map A into X and B into Y. Then "of(A,f(A))" and "of(B,f(B))" are both true, so that "of(~(R),f(~(R)))"
is also true. Thus we have the following identifications:
In Figure  2 (b) "of(B~" and "of(C,Y)'" are both true, so "'of(~'(Rl),~)is also. Thus we may let c be Y and rs be RI, giving us the wide reading for "a company".
In the case where no one represents any company and no one arrived, we can let c be anything and rs be the empty set.
Since, by the definition of o" , any predicate indexed by the empty set will be true of the typical element of the empty set, "arrlve#(~(# ))" will be true, and the sentence will be satisfied.
It is worth pointing out that this approach solves the problem of the classic "donkey sentences".
If in sentence (14) we had had the verb phrase "hates it", then "it" would be resolved to c, and thus to whatever c was resolved to. given in a longer version of this paper.
Other Determlners
The approach of Section 2 will not work for monotone decreasing determiners, such as "few" and "no".
Intuitively, the reason is that the sentences they occur in make statements about entities other than just those in the sets referred to by the noun phrase. Thus, Few men work.
is more a negative statement about all but a few of the men than a positive statement about few of them.
One possible representation would be similar to (I), but wlth the implication reversed. This is unappealing, however, among other things, because the predicate P occurs twice, making the relation between sentences and logical forms less direct.
Another approach would take advantage of the above intuition about what monotone decreasing determiners convey. That is, we convert the sentence into a negative assertion about the complement of the noun phrase, reducing this case tO the monotone increasing case.
For example, "few men work" would be represented as follows: 
